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Abstract 
 
In Roman Law, manifest theft (essentially, the one in which a thief was caught in the act) was punished with a 
more severe penalty than non-manifest theft. This legal policy seems to contradict the multiplier principle and 
efficient deterrence. Apparently, we should expect the penalty for manifest theft to be lower than for non-
manifest theft since the probability of detection and conviction is higher for the former and lower for the latter. 
In this paper, we provide several efficiency-based arguments to solve the puzzle.    
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1. Introduction 
 
In Roman Law, the offenses (crimina) punishable by criminal Courts, following a State-controlled 
procedure, were either offenses directly against the political community (like treason, for instance), 
or offenses which were directed at individuals but produced insecurity in the entire community 
(some instances of murder, for example). These Courts, together with their rules and procedures, 
covered only the offenses understood to affect the state or the society as a whole. Other actions that 
nowadays we consider as punishable crimes, like simple (furtum) and aggravated (rapina) theft, and 
assault, were considered not to be crimina, but delicta (the ancestor of torts), and left to private Law 
courts and private prosecution. They were thought to have only an individualized effect upon a 
particular victim. However, forgery and counterfeiting (falsum) was a public quaestio because it was 
seen as making everyone’s property more insecure (Andrew RIGGSBY,1999). 
 
The victim suffering from a given behavior could go to civil courts or before the authorities to lay 
charges. In the vast majority of the cases, the authorities had no reason to intervene since reparation 
was paid.  Certain classes of thieves were identified as very dangerous to society (usually due to 
large scale operations) and aggravated penalties were imposed by criminal courts. In these cases, the 
state intervened and it is not clear if a choice of prosecuting these classes of thief in civil courts was 
given to the victim. 
 
Roman criminal or standing jury Courts (iudicia publica) are somehow different from the institutions 
with that name nowadays. The criminal inquiry (quaestiones) was heavily adversarial. The defendant, 
represented by one or more counsels, was faced by a private person (singular or plural) who acted as 
prosecutor. Neither side was typically a legal professional, though these were usually consulted. The 
state could accept or reject (by the praetor or a less important officer) the case, and would arrange for 
the best prosecutor in case more than one claim was made. The penalties were fixed by law, and 
damages should be assessed by the same jury in a separate proceeding (litis aestimatio). The court was 
presided by the praetor or his subordinate (quaesitor). No clear guidelines existed to determine the 
burden of proof. 
 
Most of the offenses in Roman Law gave the injured party a right to civil actions1. These offenses 
were designated as delicta, including larceny and theft (furtum), robbery with violence (rapina), 
damage or losses to property (damnum iniuria datum), and personal injury (iniuria). Some other acts 
were described as quasi delicts. These quasi delicts bear, to some extent, a resemblance to modern 
vicarious liability principles, when one person is liable for acts of other people (e.g., employees) even 
though he is unaware of what they are doing. 
 
                                                          
1 Those technically civil actions could be punitive (actiones poenales) in nature, like a given multiple of the stolen sum, 
restitutionary (actiones reipersecutoriae), like recovery of stolen gods, or mixed (actiones mixtae). The first two kinds 
could be accumulated in a given case.  
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The delict of theft could be manifest (furtum manifestum) or non-manifest (furtum nec manifestum). 
Manifest theft took place when the thief was caught in the act (or before the thing was transferred to 
the place the thief had designated for its storage). The penalty would be four times the value of the 
stolen good2, whereas for non-manifest theft the penalty was just the double. The more severe 
penalty for manifest theft is explained by legal historians as an incentive for the victim (the injured 
party) not to kill the thief caught in the act and comply with legal proceedings (Henry SUMNER 
MAINE, 1986, but originally 18613; Theodor MOMSEN, 1899), and as the result of certainty that the 
person apprehended is the thief (Alan WATSON, 1991)4. Killing the thief was generally unlawful5. 
 
The incentive for the victim not to kill was reinforced by the existence of noxal liability since it 
created a fair chance of reparation (Olivia ROBINSON, 1995)). When a delictual action was brought 
against the father or the master (paterfamilias) for the wrong committed by the son or by the slave, the 
former had the choice of either paying the amount due, or of handing over his dependent. However, 
if the master himself was directly involved in the wrongful action, he usually lost his right to noxal 
surrender6. 
 
A ritual search (lance et licio) for stolen property was established7. If the stolen property was found, 
the theft was treated as manifest. When the stolen property was found without the formal search, the 
penalty was reduced to three times the value of the stolen goods8.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
2 In archaic Roman Law, it is claimed that manifest theft led to corporal punishment and even enslavement (for 
adults), whipping (for impubers), and corporal punishment and immediate throwing from the Tarpeian rock (for 
slaves). See MONTESQUIEU (1772); Francisco HERNANDEZ TEJERO (1951); Reinhard ZIMMERMANN (1996). 
 
3 Henry SUMNER MAINE thought that the scale of punishment was adjusted to the degree of revenge sentiments in the 
victims that would arise as a likely consequence of the thief’s action.  
 
4 We will later examine in detail the rationale behind these theories of the Roman distinction. 
 
5 Until the second century AD, it was lawful to kill someone stealing at night (fur nocturnus), or using a weapon even 
during daylight (fur diurnus qui telo se defendit), with the only requirement to call other people to watch the killing of 
the thief (obviously, to prevent strategic use of these self-defense possibilities). 
 
6 In later stages of legal development (post-classical period), only slaves could be noxally surrendered. Also it seems 
that noxal surrender has never applied to women. On noxae deditio, from an economic perspective, see Francesco 
PARISI (2001). 
 
7 The ritual involved being naked, except for an apron (licium) to conceal the privy parts, and carrying a dish (lanx) in 
each hand, all of this presumably as an expiation to the household gods disturbed by the search. See Reinhard 
ZIMMERMANN (1996). 
 
8 This remedy could be obtained through the actio concepti. The action depended on whether or not the owner of the 
household where the stolen goods were found was the thief. The householder could have an action against the person 
who placed the stolen goods in his household (furtum oblatum). 
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Violent robbery (rapina9) was initially subject to the same penal remedy (in quadruplum) than 
manifest theft, and even later, during the Justinian period, the penal remedy was reduced to three 
times the value of the stolen goods, although the victim could claim restitution of the property 
through rei vindicatio or condictio10. 
 
 
2. Is the Roman Rule an Exception in Historical and Present Terms? 
 
In ancient Germanic Law, the prevailing rule against unlawful actions over property seems to have 
at the same time coincided and departed from the classical Roman rule, because it privileged, in 
terms of magnitude of punishment, overt illegal actions over concealed ones. Secret and concealed 
takings of someone else’s property (Diebstahl), even those not involving any violence or further 
damage, were punished more severely than open and aggressive takings (Raub) of goods belonging 
to others. However, in case of a concealed taking being the criminal caught on the spot (or after 
house search on closed premises, an extension of the concept resembling somewhat the Roman lance 
et licio search) -handhafter Diebstahl- was subject to more severe penalties, often involving execution 
of the thief 11.  
 
Traditional rules of Roman Law of theft seem to have survived in the early Middle Ages. In the Lex 
Romana Visigothorum or Breviarum Alaricianum (AD 506), the distinction between manifest and non 
manifest theft is kept, and the same happens with the corresponding penalties ad quadruplum and ad 
duplum. The also visigothic Liber Judiciorum (AD 654), considers non-manifest theft the central 
concept of furtum, with the familiar ad duplum penalty. In addition to that, it establishes a range of 
types of aggravated theft, which includes the manifest, but also the nightly theft, theft of goods 
belonging to the Treasury, theft contested in Court by the defendant. The penalty foreseen for all 
these types is nine times the value of the stolen goods. Moreover, when the defendant cannot pay the 
penalty, he becomes the slave of the plaintiff12. 
 
                                                          
9 Although certain circumstances surrounding the act made a non-violent theft a rapina: public unrest, catastrophe, 
fire. 
 
10 For furtum the penal action for quadruplum could be added to the civil restitutionary remedy. 
 
11See Heinrich BRUNNER (1958). See also David FRIEDMAN (1979) on the punishment for murder in medieval Iceland: 
After killing a man, the killer was obliged to announce that fact immediately. A killer who tried to hide the body, or 
otherwise conceal his responsibility, was guilty of murder. Killing was made up by a fine, and for a murder a man 
could be outlawed, even if he was willing to pay a fine instead. 
 
12 See Gonzalo RODRÍGUEZ MOURULLO (1962). 
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In later centuries, the direct influence of the Roman criminal Law rules seems to have waned to a 
certain extent13, probably in favor of local customs of Germanic origin.  Canon Law, with its 
emphasis on penitence and forgiveness, may have also played a role in the decreased importance of 
the Roman conceptual distinction. Still, its basic content was far from dead. Many local regulations 
(fueros, in the Spanish historical term), at least in Southern Europe, seem to have kept the distinction 
between vencido por furto (literally, won at theft: the defendant lost in Court after legal proceedings 
for theft) and preso por furto (literally, captured at theft: the thief was captured in flagrantis), 
punishing the latter more severely (often with duplum but also with death on top of the monetary 
penalty). We have even found other rules in Medieval Criminal Law resembling the Roman rule on 
furtum, thus punishing flagrant actions less heavily, but referred to other kinds of illegal acts.  
 
The Fuero de León (AD 1020 approximately), which was widely enforced at the time across the 
northwestern quadrant of the Iberian Peninsula, punished more severely the murderer who was 
caught within 9 days of the murder. In fact, if the murderer could return home after 9 days without 
being caught, he could escape any punishment, public or private.  
In the early renaissance period, the German Constitutio Criminalis Carolina (1532) still mentions the 
distinction between secret and public theft, and imposes duplum and quadruplum in favor of the 
victim, respectively. But the distinction applied no more than to petty theft, and only when the thief 
was an otherwise respectable person and could pay the penalty14. 
 
In later periods, general ideological and political trends, and technological changes concerning crime 
prevention and law enforcement, led to the progressive assumption by the State of crime prevention 
and sanctioning activities. This, in turn, seems to have produced the elimination of the old Roman 
rules on actiones poenales, which were based on the exercise of formally private actions by the 
aggrieved party. The separation between manifest and non-manifest theft was but one part of this 
private enforcement system of crime prevention rules. Moreover, during the XVIIIth century the rule 
was subject to severe criticism by very influential theorists, such as MONTESQUIEU and Cesare 
BECCARIA. The former called the distinction barbaric, because the difference in penalties had nothing 
to do with the nature of the crime15. The latter expressed the policy of employing the use of force as 
the only basis for aggravating penalties in theft16. In the XIX century, SUMNER MAINE named the 
conceptual distinction archaic, and based upon a rude jurisprudence17. 
                                                          
13 In those legal documents showing a heavier influence of the late medieval reception of Roman Law, such as the 
Castilian Partidas (1256-1263) of King Alphonsus X the Wise, the Roman distinction between manifest and non-
manifest theft, and their different monetary penalties, have been preserved almost verbatim, with the addition in both 
cases of corporal punishment. But manifest theft is no longer one of the cases of aggravated theft (where death 
penalty is imposed), which now cover the theft of precious goods (as defined by the owner: the Church or the King). 
See also José Maria RODRÍGUEZ DEVESA (1951). 
  
14 Otherwise, the thief was subject to pillory, whipping, and banishment. 
 
15 See MONTESQUIEU (1772). 
 
16 Cesare BECCARIA (2003, but first 1764). 
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It should be noted, however, that Markus DUBBER (2001) discusses an act passed by the British 
Parliament in 1851 setting a three-year prison term for a person caught by night in possession of 
certain goods (for example, a key or a picklock) without lawful excuse, the burden of proof for such 
excuse being on his or her side. 
 
In modern Criminal Law, the distinction between manifest and non-manifest actions, and also in the 
field of illegal takings of property, seems to have become virtually meaningless. Criminal sanctions 
for theft are aggravated when violence or threats are used to execute the taking, or when damage on 
other pieces of property (like in a forceful break-in into a house) results from the theft18. Concealed 
and secretive illegal actions (including theft) tend to be, in general terms, more severely punished by 
Modern Criminal Laws19. Voluntary surrender to the authorities soon after the crime is committed, 
which was an instance of manifest theft in Roman Law, involves a lighter punishment for the 
criminal20. It is not surprising that committing the action involves a lighter penalty and the sanction 
will be reduced when, after the fact the author of the crime, including theft, turns himself in to the 
authorities, or voluntarily confesses to the crime before being captured. These cases, if close enough 
in time to the illegal taking, were deemed manifest theft in Roman Law, and subject to the increased 
penalties of manifest theft.  
 
It is true, though, that crimes discovered in flagrantis usually involve a speedier trial and a higher 
likelihood of the imposition of the criminal sanction, thus weakening to a greater or lesser extent, in 
expected terms, the impact of any decrease in the magnitude of sanctions for manifest theft that the 
doctrines just referred in modern Criminal Law might imply. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
17 Henry SUMNER MAINE (1986, but originally 1861). 
 
18 Art. 237, Código penal, for Spain. For Portugal, Art. 71, Código penal. For Germany, Paragraphs 243, 244, and 249 
Strafgesetzbuch. 
 
19 Art. 22, Código penal, for Spain. For Portugal, Art. 91, Código do processo penal. For Germany, Paragraph 46 
Strafgestetzbuch. 
 
20 Art. 21 Código penal, for Spain. For Portugal, Art. 72, Código penal. For Germany, Paragraph 46 Strafgestezbuch. 
 7
InDret 1/2005   Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez 
3. An Economic Analysis of Manifest and non-Manifest Theft 
 
The economic model suggests (for example, Mitchell POLINSKY and Steven SHAVELL, 2000) that 
efficient deterrence (or optimal law enforcement) is achieved when the expected sanction equals the 
social harm caused by the crime or offense (the so-called multiplier principle)21. In the case of 
manifest theft the probability of detection and punishment is higher than in the case of non-manifest 
theft for the same level of resources invested in apprehension and punishment. Apparently, we 
should expect the sanction for manifest theft to be lower than for non-manifest theft for the same 
underlying unlawful act (that is, generating the same level of social harm)22. The fact that the 
sanction for manifest theft was in fact higher than non-manifest theft is at odds with the multiplier 
principle and seems to be inefficient. 
 
These observations are reinforced if we analyze the matter in the context of the economic models of 
avoidance activities (for example, Arun MALIK, 1990) and self-reporting (for example, Louis KAPLOW 
and Steven SHAVELL, 1994). Manifest theft could be seen as an expression of self-reporting behavior 
by which offenders make detection and prosecution easier whereas non-manifest theft could be 
understood as a consequence of criminal avoidance activities (offenders exert some effort to hide 
unlawful activities). There are two reasons why penalties should be designed to encourage manifest 
rather than non-manifest theft. First, it lowers investigation and prosecution costs for victims. 
Second, it reduces criminal avoidance activities that are just a waste of resources (and make detection 
and punishment more costly).  
 
Looking from a perspective of marginal deterrence (for example, George STIGLER, 1970), we could 
say that manifest theft is less socially harmful than the non-manifest version of it (because it involves 
wasteful avoidance activities). Therefore the penalty for the former should be lower than for the 
latter. If individuals are not deterred, at least they should be given an incentive to commit manifest 
theft (easier to punish) rather than non-manifest theft (more difficult to punish and with costly 
criminal avoidance activities). Again the principle used in Roman Law is totally at odds with this 
conclusion23. 
 
                                                          
21 This general result should be carefully qualified since the social harm could also include enforcement costs 
necessary to achieve deterrence, including judicial measurement costs to authenticate theft, see Mitchell POLINSKY and 
Steven SHAVELL (2000). 
 
22 In some cases, manifest theft is more harmful than non-manifest theft and hence punishment should be more 
severe. This will certainly be the case when theft is done in the face of the victim, with more emotional harm, or when 
it includes confrontational elements. 
 
23 Another possibility is that manifest theft is in fact a kind of unfinished crime, hence the marginal deterrence 
principle would justify a penalty enhancement for non-manifest theft on the basis of the harm difference between 
unfinished and finished theft. 
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In summary, Roman Law seems to violate the multiplier principle as well as the principle of 
marginal deterrence (in the context of avoidance activities and self-reporting). However, we should 
not conclude immediately that sanctioning more severely manifest theft is necessarily inefficient or 
no economic rationale can be provided. We investigate three nonexclusive perspectives. 
 
3.1. Legal Error or Wrong Conviction: Problems with Enforcement Technology 
 
a) Richard POSNER’s Explanation 
 
One possible explanation of the rule is the one advanced by Richard POSNER (1981). For POSNER the 
logic of the rule lies behind the willingness to avoid an excessive level of wrongful convictions for 
non-manifest theft. When the thief is not captured on the spot, and speedily brought before justice, 
that is, when theft is non-manifest, the likelihood of mistakenly convicting an innocent is high, due to 
the high costs and quick obsolescence of evidence in societies such as that of Ancient Rome: to 
provide evidence post-factum is very costly, given that written records are scarce and expensive 
(vellum and not paper is used, most people do not read nor write), and oral testimony is more 
perishable and less reliable than it is now. Other evidentiary instruments (so-called scientific modes 
of evidence, such as fingerprints, or DNA sampling and comparison) were non-existent or extremely 
primitive. So a reduced penalty for non-manifest theft makes sense to reduce the social burden of 
wrongful convictions for theft. 
 
In modern times, the probability of mistaken convictions for both kinds of theft has substantially 
equalized, and thus, given the increased probability of conviction for manifest theft, it is efficient to 
eliminate the privilege of non-manifest theft in terms of sanction, and, may be, even to invert the 
Roman rule, and punish manifest theft more lightly than non-manifest theft. 
 
This theory seems to fit well also with the broad application of the actio furti in Roman Law. Furtum 
covered a substantially broader ground than the modern concept of theft24. Any use25 of a thing by a 
non-owner contradicting the desires of the owner could give rise to the actio furti. For instance, if a 
lessee mishandled the leased good, or an agent used for private purposes the good of the principal 
there was a case of furtum26.  
 
                                                          
24 It can be argued that the distinction between manifest and non-manifest theft was an interim taxonomy along the 
road to identifying what we now regard as theft. 
 
25 Provided it is in bad faith: Dolus malus is an element of the ideal type of furtum: Paulus, 2.31.1: Fur est qui dolo malo 
rem alienam contrectat. 
 
26 For instance, the Epitome Gaius 2, 10, 3 cites as a case of furtum that of the rider of a donkey for a longer distance 
than the one authorized by the owner. And Justinian’s Instituta  IV. I.6  say that if a person ride a horse that was lent 
to him for the purpose further than was contemplated, there is theft. In Digest 13.I. 18, to knowingly receive coins that 
are not owed is considered theft. 
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These cases of illegitimate or abusive uses of assets which were voluntarily put in possession of the 
potential offender, are typically hard to discern from cases of legitimate uses, because one needs to 
interpret the contract (which may be an oral contract) to determine the legal consequences of such a 
use. Given that this grey area is much more common for non-manifest behavior, the lighter 
punishment for the latter reduces the cost of wrongful convictions of legitimate users of alien 
property. 
 
The Posnerian theory of ancient criminal Law rules (minimization of wrongful convictions) has been 
subject to criticism, however, on the basis of its inability to explain other common rules in ancient 
legal systems, such as the Biblical rule that sanctions theft of cattle and sheep more severely when the 
thief has killed or dispose of them, than when the animals are still in possession of the criminal27. 
 
b) Economic Interpretations of Legal Historians’ Explanations 
 
Related to legal error and the likelihood of wrong convictions, some legal historians (for example, see 
Andrew RIGGSBY, 1999) offer an explanation for more severe punishment of manifest theft based on 
the preferences of the Roman legal professionals. According to this view, Roman legal professionals 
were very much concerned with the reputation of the legal system, namely that offenders but not 
innocent people were punished under Roman Law. Punishing innocent people would generate a 
high reputation cost that could undermine the credibility of Roman Law and trust in the political and 
judicial organization of society. In order to avoid this cost, or at least reduce its magnitude, the 
sanction should be lower when there is a higher probability of wrongful conviction.  
 
This argument is actually quite close to Thomas MICELI (1991) and can be given an economic 
interpretation. A model where deterrence goals are weighted against a cost of miscarriage of justice 
is developed. He concludes that lower sanctions are consistent with optimal law enforcement. The 
rationale for this conclusion is that the marginal cost of miscarriage of justice is positive and 
increasing in sanctions (higher sanctions mean that innocent individuals wrongly convicted will be 
more severely punished). A social-welfare maximizing government should balance the deterrence 
marginal gain of a higher sanction against the marginal cost of miscarriage of justice, a point 
neglected by previous literature. 
 
                                                          
27 See Francesco PARISI (2001) for this criticism. 
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There is nevertheless a possible second economic interpretation for the argument by legal historians. 
When jurists and judges care about wrong convictions, there could be a chilling effect caused by high 
penalties. Consequently a negative correlation might be established between sanction and 
probability of conviction for a certain level of legal error. Imposing a higher sanction for non-
manifest theft than for manifest theft could lead judges to punish non-manifest theft too 
infrequently. Therefore, a lower sanction for non-manifest theft could be justified in order to induce 
judges to apply and enforce it, given the likelihood of wrong conviction28. 
 
These two economic interpretations are quite distinct in substance but compatible with the 
explanation provided by legal historians. The first argument, along the lines of Thomas MICELI 
(1991), justifies less severe punishment for non-manifest crime by means of a trade-off where 
deterrence is balanced against cost of miscarriage of justice. The second argument relies only on 
deterrence by arguing that severe sanctions and penalties could be enforced less frequently if there is 
legal error (due to a chilling effect on judicial behavior), and therefore the expected sanction could 
end up being lower when a very high sanction is chosen than when a less severe sanction is set.  
 
3.2. Private Nature of Criminal Prosecution: Adequate Incentives for Victims 
 
a) The Theory based on Private Retaliation Avoidance (Francesco PARISI, 2001) 
 
Francesco PARISI sees the gradual emergence of talionic principles (eventually, subject to multipliers) 
in ancient Laws of different societies as an evolutionary process that avoids the very harmful 
consequences of unlimited exercise of retaliation and private justice, specially when not just one 
person, but a family, clan, or tribe is at stake. So the talionic penalty should provide sufficient moral 
satisfaction to the victim, or his or her clan, for the offense suffered, so that the risk of inefficient 
physical retaliation is avoided. According to him, the use of multipliers for redistributive crimes, 
such as theft, is explained by two factors: Firstly, differences in valuation by offender and victim tend 
to be small. Second, probability of detection of such crimes was also small.   
 
Also legal historians (most notably Alan WATSON, 1991) have detected a major concern with manifest 
theft leading to excessive private punishment (for example, the victim could end up killing the 
offender for relatively unimportant or costless thefts). From this perspective, the difference in 
sanctions for manifest and non-manifest theft is not justified by the underlying harm they generate, 
but by the need for achieving deterrence of private punishment in manifest theft.  A more severe 
                                                          
28 It must be noted that a chilling effect of harsh penalties on judicial sanctioning attitudes can happen regardless of 
the likelihood of judicial mistake. If Courts think a new penalty introduced by the legislature is excessive or 
disproportionate to the wrongfulness of the offense, they might resort to interpretive methods or strategies that 
reduce the impact of the increased penalty. In fact, it is not uncommon in Europe that Constitutional Courts strike 
down sanctions imposed by Statute on the grounds that their magnitude violates the principle of proportionality in 
sanctioning that is written, or implicitly found, in several European Constitutions. It is clear, though, that the risk of 
legal error and wrongful convictions increases the chances, and the size, of the possible chilling effect. 
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sanction guarantees compensation for the victim both in terms of monetary reward, but also with 
respect to retribution.  
 
b) Inefficiency of Private Punishment: Fundamental Divergence Between Optimal Punishment and 
Private Choices 
 
Explanations based on private retaliation avoidance touch on a more general issue, namely private 
bargaining between offender and victim. A clear distinction between non-manifest and manifest 
thefts is the possibility of private deals (including the possibility of private punishment). Generally 
speaking, private punishment is not expected to be efficient (Steven SHAVELL, 1993) due to the fact 
that victims, typically, only care about the harm they have suffered, that is, they do not care about 
the benefits to the offender and possible effects on third parties. Victims maximize their own 
expected utility, not social welfare. 
 
There is a fundamental divergence between socially optimal punishment and private punishment by 
victims (or more generally by victims and third-parties). Private punishment could be below or 
above the efficient level. On one hand, victims ignore the harm caused by the theft for third parties 
and the social benefit in terms of future deterrence from public enforcement (this point is especially 
problematic if secret private deals are arranged between the two parties). Nevertheless, on the other 
hand, victims also neglect the benefit generated by the theft to the offender as well as other possible 
social benefits such as income redistribution (in particular, in the absence of a welfare state). Along 
this line, it could be argued that the increased penalty of manifest theft tried to avoid inefficient 
(from a social welfare perspective) bargains after the theft between thief and victim. Naturally we 
should expect that the fact that someone was a thief, to be hidden by a private deal and not made 
public, therefore it would not be known to others who in the future might interact with the thief. 
That piece of information was socially relevant, and the fact that theft, at least in early medieval 
Roman Law, implied infamy for the offender, attests to this. In this respect, the higher sanction for 
furtum manifestum would serve similar objectives as the punishment of blackmail29.  
 
                                                          
29 See Fernando GÓMEZ and Juanjo GANUZA (2001) on the relationship between the social value of personal 
information and the Law of blackmail. 
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In cases of non-manifest theft, the likelihood of ex post factum private composition between victim 
and thief was slim, so the victim, in order to obtain remedy, had to initiate legal proceedings: The 
discrediting information concerning the thief would be known to the entire community, which 
would improve social welfare. When the thief was caught by the victim, the likelihood of private 
composition was high, so the information on the thief would not reach the whole community. 
Increasing the monetary penalty for manifest theft30 would make private hidden deals less likely, 
because the thief would be, with higher probability, unable to pay the amount that the victim would 
try to extract from him: the higher the penalty, the higher the bribe that the private enforcer would 
ask to abstain from enforcing. Why would the victim, then, insist in enforcing, and not simply trying 
to cash in the entire wealth of the thief caught on the spot? Because if, after the civil trial the thief was 
insolvent and could not pay the increased penalty for manifest theft (quadruplum), the victim could 
enslave the thief, that is, obtain an asset likely to be more valuable than the entire material wealth of 
the offender31.  
 
c) Precaution Incentives for the Victim 
 
Another important aspect to be considered when law enforcement technology is not very 
sophisticated is the behavior of potential victims to avoid theft. Precaution becomes particularly 
relevant when public enforcement of the law is not very well organized and accurate judicial 
measurement is highly costly.  
 
Generally speaking, private precaution aims at deterring theft. Nevertheless, when it does not fully 
deter offenders, it may make a successful theft to be more difficult to complete.  For example, 
building fences and hiding valuable objects might not deter someone from breaking in, but it reduces 
the likelihood that such person will easily find a valuable object to steal and will make escaping more 
difficult.  
 
A reduction in the chances of successfully escaping without being caught increases, for the same 
underlying offense, the likelihood of being manifest rather than non-manifest theft.  Therefore, 
providing incentives for private precaution could be interpreted as a mechanism not only to deter 
theft, but also to increase the proportion of manifest rather than non-manifest for the undeterred 
thefts. 
                                                          
30 The legal system could also outlaw and sanction private arrangements between offender and victim, as most 
modern legal systems do in most circumstances. Roman Law might have been factually unable to do so, because of 
entrenched beliefs of private justice and reparation among the citizenry, or unwilling to do so, given the likely 
ineffectiveness of a ban on private deals. In fact, collusion between accuser and accused was a criminal offence, and 
private agreements between parties as a cover-up for malicious behavior were restricted. It is extremely likely, 
though, that private reparation would have reached significantly higher levels of occurrence than in modern legal 
systems. 
 
31 The problem of insolvency of offenders when penalties for theft are monetary was underlined already by Cesare 
BECCARIA. 
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A more severe penalty for manifest theft could be justified as a mean to provide a higher expected 
compensation for the victim, thus somehow inducing the victim to take more and careful precaution. 
Victims are more compensated as they take more precaution, and in principle the fact that a certain 
theft was manifest rather than non-manifest could be the consequence of more private precaution. 
 
The rationale of the argument we propose is based on the idea that in the absence of incentives, 
private precaution is sub-optimal. The economic literature is not immune to controversy in this 
particular aspect (Nuno GAROUPA, 2001), but given the lack of effective public enforcement, it is not 
difficult to accept that we would need private precaution to internalize negative externalities caused 
by theft. Hence, we would expect the private choice of precaution to be less than the social efficient 
choice. 
 
3.3. Incentives for Criminals 
 
a) Shaping Preferences and the Educational Theory: Incentives for Shrewdness and Cunning 
 
MONTESQUIEU (1772) when dealing with differences between the Criminal Laws across different 
societies, expresses the view that the lighter punishment for non-manifest theft was an incentive for 
citizens to become smart and not stupid thieves. He holds32 that the Romans had adopted the rule 
inspired by the Spartan Laws by Licurgus, who only punished criminals who where incompetent 
enough to let themselves be captured on the spot or shortly thereafter. The Spartans and the Romans, 
thus, used criminal Law to instill values of shrewdness and cunning among their citizens, 
presumably for military purposes33. 
 
The historical basis of this theory is now widely discredited34, and its explanatory power is doubtful, 
though the connection it poses with societal values might illuminate somewhat the contrast of the 
Ancient Roman Law of theft with Ancient Germanic Law. 
 
 
b) Non-Manifest Theft may be Negligent, but Manifest Theft is Almost Always Willful 
 
                                                          
32 As many scholars in the XVIIIth century did, mistakenly thinking that most of Roman Law had Greek origins. 
 
33 This theory was widely shared in the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries. A popular textbook (John ROBINSON, 1807) on 
Greece explains it in the following way: Spartan youths were permitted to steal, provided they managed so dexterously as not 
to be detected in the theft; but if they were discovered, they were beaten with stripes… The design of this law was to accustom 
these to defeat the vigilance of the persons who watched over them, and exposed themselves courageously to the severest 
punishment, if they did not exert that dexterity which was required of them. 
 
34 See Wolfgang KUNKEL and Martin SCHERMEIER (2001), stressing the fact that Roman jurisprudential and legal 
thinking was largely independent of Greek influence in its formation and global conception. 
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So far we have assumed that a certain theft being manifest or non-manifest is a rational decision by 
the offender. However, given the extremely wide scope of furtum in Roman Law, there is a chance 
that some proportion of non-manifest thefts may have been in fact, even if dolus had to be 
theoretically established to be deemed furtum instances of inadvertent breach of contract35, that went 
unnoticed for some time, or even until the contractual relationship came to an end, and thus 
sanctions to deter such conduct needed not be as high as those to deter willful and overt acts of 
illegal taking.  
 
As explained by Steven SHAVELL (1993), the magnitude of the sanction is relevant at the best stage to 
intervene and deter the act. Higher sanctions are less effective in deterring negligent or inadvertent 
behavior than willful acts due to the intrinsic characteristics of the former by which the potential 
actors may not even recognize that they are on the verge of committing a given unlawful act. The 
effectiveness of penalties against theft depends not only on the probability and magnitude of the 
sanction, but on what individuals perceive or understand to be theft. Clearly the likelihood that 
manifest theft is not perceived as an unlawful act by potential offenders is lower than for non-
manifest theft. Therefore, imposing higher sanctions for non-manifest theft might not result in more 
deterrence, and at the same time, generates wrongful convictions.  
 
c) Evidence Disclosure  
 
We have debated the perverse incentive with respect to marginal deterrence by punishing more 
severely manifest theft rather than non-manifest theft. However, there is a second aspect to be 
considered. In order to achieve a conviction, evidence must be obtained and if enforcement 
technology is not very sophisticated, some cooperation by the offender could be necessary.  A 
reduced sanction for non-manifest theft could be seen as the price to pay to secure this cooperation.  
In other words, by imposing a lower sanction, the marginal benefit from withholding evidence is 
reduced, thus making conviction easier to obtain. Obviously in the case of manifest theft such 
cooperation is hardly necessary, and thus no discount is applied and a more severe sanction is 
imposed.  We could say that, in general, with manifest theft, there is no relevant evidence to be 
withheld by offenders. 
 
                                                          
35 For instance, one of the parties mistakenly or negligently may hold an interpretation of her contractual rights and 
duties that induces her to voluntarily adopt a course of action that was deemed an illegitimate use of the other party’s 
property, and thus, a furtum. It is true that, according to Justinian’s Instituta (IV.I.6), persons who use a borrowed 
thing for a purpose other than that for which it was lent, commit theft only if they are aware that they do so without 
the owner’s consent or that, had he known of it, he would not permit it, and if they (the borrowers) believe that the 
owner would agree to the use, they are not deemed guilty for theft. But the constructive agreement of the owner gives 
ample room to mistakes and overconfidence by the borrower, and to ex post strategic behavior by the owner, thus 
allowing for negligent acts that might be legally treated as theft. In fact, some of the examples given in the same 
passage of the Instituta allow us to think of this possibility (the creditor that uses the pledge, the depositee that uses 
the thing deposited, the person receiving a loan on the grounds of inviting some friends to dinner, and traveling with 
that sum of money). 
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The argument is similar to the economic defense of plea-bargaining. It is true that it makes conviction 
easier to obtain and at a lower cost for the prosecutor (public or private), however it also reduces 
expected sanctions and therefore dilutes deterrence of non-manifest theft. It is up to the government 
or the lawmakers to balance the plea-bargaining’s advantage in terms of low cost conviction against 
deterrence costs.  In the context of our paper, it could be that punishing non-manifest theft less 
severely is the outcome of a trade-off between securing more convictions at a lower cost and 
deterring non-manifest crime.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The evolution of law enforcement technology (evidence gathering, storage and analysis; judicial 
reliance on effective fact-finding and factual accuracy; effective means of tracking and surveillance of 
criminal offenders) has made the old Roman rule distinguishing manifest and non-manifest theft, 
redundant. Also recording statutes and clear title in property have reduced ambiguity concerning 
ownership. Finally, there is now a clearer sense of the limits of various actionable offenses, for 
example, conversion versus trespass to chattel, or larceny versus embezzlement. 
 
There are two lines of reasoning to justify these observations, improvement in legal accuracy and 
articulation (less probability of wrong convictions) and the increased public nature of criminal 
prosecution (private deals are less likely, and are discouraged by the legal system, eventually 
through criminal punishment itself).  
 
Though there is some discussion concerning the efficiency of private law enforcement (David 
FRIEDMAN, 1979 and 1995; Daniel KLERMAN, 2001; Nuno GAROUPA and Daniel KLERMAN, 2002; Bruce 
SMITH, 2004), the move from private to public nature of criminal prosecution was clearly associated 
with the development and improvement of law enforcement technology36. Private deals are less 
frequent when transaction costs are high, and the law increases these costs to the point of deterring 
most of them. Current law prosecutes and punishes effectively many private deals as crimes of 
obstruction to justice, or of blackmail (the victim of the initial crime becomes an offender).  
 
At the same time, modern law enforcement technology has reduced the probability of wrongful 
conviction. On the one hand, new and more sophisticated police and investigation technology 
reduces the incidence of mistakes. On the other hand, legal systems have developed different 
institutions to protect the accused and allow for effective defense, including reforms for modern 
criminal procedure, development of evidentiary rules, or changes in allocation and level of the 
required burden of proof (just remember that hear saying, evidence obtained by torture or 
involuntary pleas were commonly accepted two hundred years ago). 
 
                                                          
36 We do not claim that ideological or political influences have been absent in this process of publification of criminal 
Law and procedure, but simply that technological factors have been crucial to that effect. 
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Both changes, reduced probability of wrongful conviction and public nature of criminal prosecution, 
including that of theft, undermine an efficiency argument for a more severe punishment of manifest 
theft. Therefore, our rationale would associate the change from Roman Law to modern law with 
respect to manifest and non-manifest crime with fundamental changes in enforcement technology, 
including judicial knowledge. 
 
We find nevertheless some similarities between the rationale for plea-bargaining (an institution of 
American criminal law that has slowly entered European criminal law, in Italy in 1989, and in France 
just recently) and a less severe sanction for non-manifest theft. Plea-bargaining is most commonly 
used in non-manifest theft, since the costs of prosecution and conviction of manifest theft are 
relatively lower. One important consequence of plea-bargaining is that it effectively reduces the 
expected sanction for non-manifest theft, thus creating a situation quite similar to the rule provided 
by Roman Law.   
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